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Abstract
Previous research on lie detection suggests that people use cues to deception to make a true-false
judgment about a statement. However, no prior research has investigated what factors cause
others to classify known false statements as an intentional lie or an "honest" mistake. This
dissertation reports two studies that sought to answer this question. Experiment 1 consisted of a
diary study where participants reported false statements and then described their reason for
classifying the statements as a deliberate lie or honest mistake. In Experiment 2, participants
completed a semi-structured interview where they described various false statements and why
they classified the statement as a deliberate lie or honest mistake. I found that participants used
different kinds of cues to classify honest mistakes and deliberate lies. Perceived memorability
and lack of motive were the most common rationale participants gave for classifying a false
statement as an honest mistake. Motive, reputation, and the presence of non-verbal cues were
most associated with deliberate lies. This dissertation suggests that people classify deliberate lies
and honest mistakes using different criteria.
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Introduction

Imagine that a person tells you something, which later turns out to be untrue. There are
two possible interpretations of this situation. On the one hand, the person may have intentionally
set out to deceive you. The person may be motivated by greed, embarrassment, or a desire to
avoid responsibility for a myriad of other reasons. There is a long history of psychological
science research dealing with deception detection, and this research goes back more than a
century .(Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Zuckerman, 1981). On the other hand, the person making the
false statement, may honestly believe that the information is accurate. They may simply be
honestly mistaken or perhaps confused. There is also a long history in psychological science
dealing with honest errors in memory, perception, and inference-making that goes back more
than a century (Tourangeau, 1999).

These two pieces of literature have never been juxtaposed against each other. This gap in
our understanding is highly consequential. Deception detection research deals exclusively with
understanding how people distinguish between knowingly false statements and statements that
are true. False memory research deals with how people differentiate between statements that are
honest mistakes and statements that are true. However, what is left out is understanding how
people distinguish between false statements that are deliberately untruthful and statements that
are honest mistakes. This distinction occurs commonly in everyday life and legal contexts but to
my knowledge this has not been studied by scientists.

Consider the following example. In 1998, Vice President Al Gore was investigated for
potentially violating a law prohibiting someone from raising campaign money on government
property (Suro, 1998). Gore had apparently made fundraising calls from his office. During the
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investigation, Gore told investigators that he did not think the law applied because all the calls
involved raising soft money, not hard money. Soft money is money earmarked for political
parties or political action committees to serve generic purposes like increasing voter turnout.
Hard money, on the other hand, goes directly to the campaign for the purpose of getting a
candidate elected. It later turned out that some of the money Gore raised was indeed hard
money, money that went directly to the campaign. How are we to interpret Gore's actions. Was
he lying to federal investigators (itself a crime)? Was he uninformed? Was he honestly
mistaken? Had he been so overwhelmed by the number of calls that he honestly forgot that some
of the calls generated hard money?

In the realm of the criminal justice system, the ability to classify statements as truths or
lies is imperative because they can have life-changing implications (e.g., innocent suspect
convicted, guilty suspect avoiding justice). Occasionally we encounter clear and obvious false
information. The false statement may have been motivated by an intent to deceive, but may also
be due to some kind of "honest" mistake (e.g., Memory error). Prosecutions for the crime of
perjury hinge on this distinction (Baran & Ruby, 1997). The courts have generally recognized
that some false statements under oath occur due to the limitations of memory, limitations of
perception, misunderstandings or miscommunication (i.e., honest mistakes). Making a false
statement under oath is only a crime if it was an intentional falsehood (i.e., deliberate lie).

This dissertation reports the results of two studies that aimed to classify what factors
cause people to classify a known false statement as either an honest mistake or a deliberate lie.
First, I begin with a review of the classic and modern theories of lie detection. Next, I discuss the
occurrence of memory errors using the source-monitoring framework. Then, I review how the
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recent work involving alibi generation may inform us on the processes underlying how known
false statements are judged as a deliberate lie or an "honest" mistake. Finally, I consider the
factors that I predict cause individuals to classify a false statement as an honest mistake or
deliberate lie before describing the current studies.
Lie Detection
Traditional lie detection. Over the previous half-century, various theories sought to
explain how non-verbal and verbal cues predicted deception. Ekman and Friesen (1969)
proposed the first major cue-based theory, which broke up cues into either leakage cues or
deception cues. Leakage cues refer to a kind of non-verbal behavior that may be more readily
revealed in situations when one is trying to hide one's real feelings. For example, a leakage cue
may be a brief micro-expression (e.g., smile, smirk) that occurs when trying to suppress an
undesired emotion. Emotions that leak out while deceiving include fear of getting caught, guilt,
and duping delight (pleasure at succeeding with one's lies).
Ekman and Friesen's (1969) theory has been refined over time, including a shift in where
the leakage cues occur. Initially, Ekman hypothesized that liars primarily displayed leakage cues
in their hands and feet because deceivers actively tried to control their facial expressions.
However, Ekman later revised the theory and emphasized the micro-expressions of the face
(Ekman, 1985). While still highly influential, Ekman's theory is critiqued for its emphasis on
emotional leakage (Levine, 2014).
The 2nd popular classical theory of deception detection was proposed by Zuckerman et al.
(1981), which used a four-factor model to predict deceptive behavior. Zuckerman's model
focused on the following four factors to explain deceptive behavior, (a) generalized arousal, (b)
guilt and other emotions, (c) cognitive aspects, and (d) liars' attempts to control verbal and non-
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verbal cues to appear honest. Zuckerman proposed that liars who experience generalized arousal
display greater pupil dilation, increased blinking, more frequent speech disturbances, and speak
at a higher pitch. Additionally, when fearful or feeling guilt, liars maintain less eye contact,
fidget more, and are evasive while answering questions. Zuckerman's theory proposed that lying
is more cognitively taxing than telling the truth. Given this, liars have longer response latencies,
more speech hesitations, more significant pupil dilation, and the use of fewer illustrators (e.g.,
hand movements) than truth-tellers. Zuckerman's thoughts regarding the mentally taxing nature
of lying would influence more modern deception work, including Vrij's Cognitive Lie Detection
Approach.
The third influential theory of deception detection is DePaulo's self-presentational view.
Unlike Ekman's theory, DePaulo's research focused on everyday lies, not high-stakes lies.
According to DePaulo (1992), people actively try to regulate their non-verbal behaviors based on
self-presentational goals. According to DePaulo, liars and truth-tellers aim to convince others
they are truthful. Thus, liars and truth-tellers engage in deliberate behaviors to be perceived as
trustworthy.
Over the previous two decades, there has been a steady decrease in research investigating
nonverbal cues to deception (Verschuere et al., 2018). In the following section, we will describe
more recent theories of deception detection.

Cognitive Lie Detection Approach. The cognitive lie detection (CLD) approach aims to
move beyond criteria-based approaches, such as SVA and CBCA, and expand beyond the
classical theories. Unlike the classical approaches (e.g., Ekman, Zuckerman) to lie detection,
CLD places the observer in a more active interviewing role. The critical element of CLD is the
belief that lying requires more cognitive effort than describing a real episodic memory (Vrij et
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al., 2010). Support for CLD comes from evidence that in an interview setting, lying is more
mentally taxing than truth-telling (Christ et al., 2009). Therefore, researchers using CLD aim to
increase the cognitive load during the retrieval task to magnify the differences between truthtellers and liars.

The cognitive lie detection approach consists of (i) imposing cognitive load, (ii)asking
interviewees for more information, (iii) asking unexpected questions. Within the lie detection
literature, cognitive load increases by asking interviewees to tell their stories in reverse order
(e.g., Evans et al., 2013; Vrij et al., 2012), carry out two tasks at once while maintaining eye
contact during the interview. The 2nd approach that predicts deception is to ask interviewees for
additional information about the event in question (Vrij, 2016). To achieve this, interviewers
may use the cognitive interview or have interviewees draw an image of the event in question.
CLD proposes responses to these questions will be less detailed, take longer to generate, and
contain less information. A rationale for this is liars are cautious about providing additional
details out of fear that they might say something incriminating. The 3rd approach to CLD is to
have the interviewer ask unexpected questions during the interview. This method is to counter a
common tactic by liars, including preparing their statements beforehand and practicing
answering anticipated questions.
According to a meta-analysis conducted by Vrij et al. (2017), the cognitive lie detection
(71%) approach predicts veracity significantly more than the standard (non-interviewing)
approach (56%). Additionally, the cognitive lie detection approach (65%) revealed significantly
more cognitive cues than the standard approach (30%). More specifically, CLD elicited more
detail, plausibility, and consistency cues than the standard approach.
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While highly influential, this approach has several flaws. Unlike what CLD proposes,
lying is not always more mentally taxing than telling the truth (Sporer, 2016). Second, CLD is
unproven regarding intentions to lie and or stigmatized individuals. Finally, CLD lacks a robust
theoretical model that emphasizes specific cognitive processes in lying (Sporer, 2016).
Truth-Default Theory. Truth-Default Theory (TDT) is a theory of deception and
deception detection that operates under the assumption that when humans interact with one
another, they are typically honest (Levine, 2014). Therefore, humans tend to believe others
unless a trigger to deception is activated. TDT incorporates the idea that people are typically
"truth-biased" into its framework (McCornack & Parks, 1986; Zuckerman et al., 1981). TDT
incorporates several free-standing models including, the Few Prolific Liars Model (Serota et al.,
2010; Serota & Levine, 2015), Deception Motives Model (Levine, Kim, & Hamel, 2010), and
the Park–Levine Probability Model (Park & Levine, 2001). Unlike the pre-TDT viewpoints,
TDT does not view truth-bias as maladaptive and a flawed decision rule (Buller & Burgoon,
1996; O'Sullivan, 2003). According to TDT, operating on a truth-default assumption allows for
more efficient communication (Levine, 2014). This idea is supported by both the base rate of
lying and the veracity effect. In typical research paradigms, there is a 50/50 chance of being
exposed to a truthful or false statement, and truth-bias impacts the direction of these errors (see
veracity effect). In more naturalistic settings, base rates of receiving an honest message are much
higher (Levine, 2014; Serota & Levine, 2015). When this is taken into account, truth bias
enhances deception detection accuracy in non-research situations (Levine & Serota, 2015).
Furthermore, there is evidence that deception detection accuracy is contingent on truth-lie base
rates (Levine, 1999). The Park-Levine model (Park, Levine, 2017) is a well-supported formula
used to predict accuracy rates based on different truth-lie base rates (Levine et al., 2014; Levine
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et al., 2006). The Park-Levine model makes the case that truth-bias is advantageous in most
everyday circumstances because the probability of being told the truth outweighs that of a lie.
Therefore, truth-bias is only detrimental in circumstances where the risks of being lied to
dramatically outweigh the likelihood of encountering a truthful message.
The Adaptive Lie Detector Theory (ALIED). Adaptive Lie Detector Theory (ALIED)
is based upon the adaptive decision-making perspective and seeks to explain how people judge
veracity (Street, 2015). According to ALLIED, we rely on a combination of individuating
information and contextual information to make veracity judgments. The ALLIED perspective
uses contextual information to explain both truth-bias and lie-bias. It is argued that truth-bias
occurs in situations where individuating cues are weak. When this happens, people rely on
generalized contextual information, such as that, in general,
people are truthful in everyday conversation (Street et al., 2016). However, a lie-bias would
occur if the situation or person in question suggests that there would be an increased likelihood
to deceive (Street & Richardson, 2015). For example, if CCTV footage of a suspect at the crime
scene were available, we rely on this individuating information instead of the more general
contextual information. Since most of the time individuating information is unavailable, an
educated guess about general information is used. Additionally, according to ALLIED, good
liars can exploit others by building trust and exploiting it. ALLIED is supported by the findings
suggesting the less diagnostic the cues, the more the participants used context-general
information (specifically, the base-rates of lying) to assess veracity (Street et al., 2016).
Information Manipulation Theory-2. The original Information Manipulation Theory
(IMT; McCornack, 1992) aimed to move beyond the typical bald-faced lies (BFLs) and baldfaced truths (BFTs) dichotomy that was predominant among most classic deception researchers.
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Information Manipulation Theory accounts for messages somewhere between BFLs and BFTs.
According to IMT, messages are considered deceptive if they contain one or more violations of
Grice's maxims quantity, quality, relevance, and manner.
Information Manipulation Theory- 2 (IMT2) moved beyond IMT and is a deceptive
message production theory. At its core, IMT2 uses Grice's (1989) Cooperative Principle as a
foundation. During interactions, messages consist of four maxims, Quantity (the amount of
information provided), Quality (The veracity of the information provided), Manner (How
information is uttered), and Relation (Relevance of information shared). Unlike traditional
approaches to discourse production, IMT2 does not propose that a decision to make a BFL or a
BFT comes before the message is initially produced. IMT2 proposes an opportunistic problemsolving approach where people adjust on the fly" in an attempt to reach their desired end goal.
IMT2 consists of three theoretical propositions, including (1) intentional states (I.S.), (2)
cognitive load (CL), and (3) information manipulation (I.M.).
According to I.S., deception will only occur when considered the most efficient way to
achieve one's goal. Additionally, the intention to deceive may arise or decay at any time point
during the production of speech. According to the CL proposition, deception is not always more
cognitively effortful than truth-telling. Instead, the relative load of truthful and deceptive
messages depends on the information activated from memory and contextual factors surrounding
the problem (McCornack, 1997; Walczyk, 2013). Additionally, deceptive messages proven
successful are easier to repeat (less load-inducing) because they are easier to construct and
automatic. According to I.M. propositions, Quality and Quantity violations occur when the most
accessible information from memory is considered harmful to achieving one's goal.
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Additionally, Quantity violations should be the most common form of deception because
one can edit out information from memory that they do not want to be disclosed. The least
common type of deception should be Relational violations and should only occur when
providing any information that would seem dangerous to achieving one's end goal. According to
I.M., when there is a violation of quality, the information given is not "made up" but drawn from
real memories. Finally, speakers show behavioral cues to deception when there are no plausible
alternatives from memory to construct a deceptive message. In these circumstances, the speaker
may take longer than usual to speak, have more pauses, and mention irrelevant information.
Verbal Cues to Deception. Given the limited findings supporting non-verbal cues of
deception, a better method for detecting deception may be verbal cues to deception. When
investigating the effectiveness of verbal cues of deception, researchers commonly apply one of
three verbal veracity tools: Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN), Statement Validity Analysis
(SVA), and Reality Monitoring (R.M.).
Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN)The Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN) is a
criteria-based verbal veracity tool that is among the most commonly used by criminal
investigators (Vrij, 2008). SCAN is used worldwide by federal agencies, law enforcement, and
private investigators in many countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Belgium,
and Israel. According to SCAN, truth-tellers and liars differ in the kind of language displayed in
their statements (Sapir, 2005). When using the SCAN procedure, the interviewer asks the
examinee to write down as much information as possible about the critical period from the event
in question (Sapir, 2005). According to SCAN, truthful written statements consist of 20% of
information leading up to the event, 50% of the information about the main event, and 30% of
the information should describe what happened following the event. The greater the deviation
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from this structure, the more likely it is that the statement is deceptive. Criticisms of SCAN
include its ill-defined list of criteria, low inter-rater reliability, and lack of a standardized scoring
system (Bogaard et al., 2016). Across several studies, there have been 28 different distinct
criteria used in SCAN (Bockstaele, 2008a), 16 criteria (Bockstaele, 2008b, Smith, 2001), and in
more recent years, suggestions for 12 criteria version of SCAN (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, 2016).

Statement Validity Analysis. Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) is a deception
detection technique initially used in both Sweden (Trankell, 1963) and Germany (Undeutsch,
1967) to assess the truthfulness of an individual's account. Originally, SVA was used to
determine the credibility of child witnesses' statements about sexual assault allegations (Ruby &
Brigham, 1997). SVA is used as evidence in America (Ruby & Brigham, 1997) and some
Western European countries, including Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden (Vrij,
2008). SVA consists of a combination of several components, including (i) a case-file analysis,
(ii) a semi-structured interview, (iii) a Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), and (iv) a
Validity Checklist. A case-file analysis provides the SVA expert with essential information about
the witness (e.g., age, cognitive ability), any previous witness statements, and other important
case characteristics. The SVA expert conducts a semi-structured interview that is investigative
and allows for content to be analyzed via CBCA. Below I will discuss the CBCA and the validity
checklist.

Criteria-Based Content Analysis. Criteria-based content analysis (CBCA) is a verbal
veracity tool based on the Undeutch (1967) hypothesis, which states that the content of real and
imagined memories should fundamentally differ from each other (Steller, 1989). Fabricated
statements are thought to contain fewer details and are less vivid than truthful statements based
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on one's real memory (Undeutch, 1967). CBCA includes 19 content-based criteria that trained
evaluators judge the presence or absence of using a validity checklist. The CBCA consist of two
factors: cognitive (1-13) and motivational (14-18) (Köhnken, 1989, 2004). Cognitive factors,
including contextual details, the quantity of details, and descriptions of interactions, are
considered difficult to fabricate, and the presence of them indicates genuine experiences.

Additionally, motivational factors, including questioning one's memory, are considered
predictive of genuine experiences. Innocent suspects are thought to be less concerned about
impression management than guilty suspects because they are thought to operate according to the
just-world fallacy. Therefore, liars avoid adding any information in their statements that they
believe is undesirable out of fear of damaging their image (Köhnken, 1999).

According to a meta-analysis by Vrij, 2008 the CBCA discriminates between real and
imagined events at above chance levels. Across 20 separate studies, 16 times truth-tellers had
higher CBCA scores than liars (Vrij, 2008). However, not all the criteria used on the CBCA are
diagnostic measures of deception. In more recent studies, only 15 of the CBCA criteria were
diagnostic measures of deception (Amado et al., 2015; Amado et al., 2016).
CBCA is predictive of deception and has high inter-rater reliability on most criteria
(Hauch et al., 2017). However, CBCA lacks a strong theoretical foundation because it was
constructed via a bottom-up intuitive approach (Sporer, 1997).
Reality Monitoring Approach. An alternative criteria-based approach to deception
detection is the reality monitoring approach (R.M.). Like CBCA, R.M. proposes that actual
memories differ in fundamental ways compared to imagined events. According to the R.M.
approach, memories contain both 'external' and 'internal' features. External features are
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considered more indicative of real memory and include features such as perceptual information,
sensory processes, and contextual information. On the other hand, internal features are based on
reasoning, imagination, and thought processes. Statements about imagined events are believed to
describe feelings during the time of the event and contain more cognitive operations, such as, "I
must have had my coat on, as it was freezing that night" (Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Raye,
1981, 1998).
The R.M. approach contains benefits over some of the previously mentioned approaches.
Unlike CBCA, R.M. includes indicators for both perceived actual and imagined events.
Furthermore, R.M. helps distinguish between a truthful and false statement 60—70% of the time
(Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2008).
While the vast majority of R.M. studies have involved deception detection of previous
events, there is a recent interest in distinguishing true and false statements about intended events
(Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). These studies suggest that specific criteria, including cognitive
operations, clarity, reconstructability, and realism, predicted the intention to deceive. As a
whole, the R.M. criteria failed to predict true and false intentions (Giolla et al., 2019). Even
though both R.M. and CBCA have above-chance lie detection accuracy, the use within the field
has been limited (Bogaard et al., 2016).
Memory Errors
A false statement made by a person may result from a deliberate attempt to deceive, as
described above. However, a false statement may also be a function of an honest but imperfect
memory system. Previously I described theories of lie detection that primarily focused on the
distinction between honest intended accurate statements and dishonest intended false statements.
However, the source monitoring approach builds upon what was discussed earlier using the
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reality monitoring approach and deal with the distinction between honest/true and honest /false
statements. According to the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF), our memories about
episodic content do not get stored with a specific source label. Instead, stored memories contain
memory characteristics, including perceptual details (e.g., lighting, color), affective, spatial,
semantic, and temporal information used to remember the source of a retrieved memory
(Johnson et al., 1993). For instance, if auditory information in memory matches, then you will
likely associate that statement with that individual (Ferguson et al., 1992). However, even if the
event in question is correctly recalled, the assigned source to that memory can be incorrect. For
example, you might accurately recall hearing about Frederick Bartlett's classic War of the Ghosts
study. You might remember sitting in a large lecture hall with white walls and the person who
told you had a New York accent. Using this information, you might infer that your cognitive
psychology professor was the source of this memory because they have a New York accent.
However, a source-monitoring error may occur if an extroverted student with a similar accent is
in that class. These kinds of source-monitoring errors are more common when two sources share
similar characteristics (e.g., high-pitched voice, brown hair) than when sources are dissimilar to
one another (e.g., child versus middle-aged man).
When discussing S.M., sources are broken up into either internal sources (e.g., dream,
imagination) or external sources (e.g., my doctor, teacher, and dad), thus creating three S.M.
decisions. The first S.M. decision occurs when you decide between two different external
sources. For instance, you must decide if you heard advice regarding plumbing from your dad
(who is not handy) or your plumber. The second S.M. decision is when a decision is made
between two internal sources. An example of this decision is deciding whether a memory is
derived from an internal thought or a dream. Finally, the third S.M. decision determines whether
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the memory came from an internal source (e.g., imagination) and an external source (e.g.,
newspaper). This S.M. decision is similar to the questions raised by the previously described
reality monitoring. (Johnson, 1981). Unlike reality monitoring, source monitoring is not limited
to dichotomous distinctions (real or imagined), and the "source" component has unlimited
options. (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). In these circumstances, memories of imagined
events are less vivid and contain less perceptual, temporal, and spatial information than real
events (Johnson et al., 1993). However, you might attribute a memory of an event to be your
imagination if it was from a place you know you never visited (Johnson, 2000).
Since source attributions are made rapidly using a match-to-average- characteristic
heuristic, we may unknowingly provide a false account even when we intend to tell accurate
information. One factor contributing to S.M. errors is the amount of attention paid toward
actively monitoring the memory source. These judgment processes are influenced by factors
including, but not limited to, attention, social context, and type of task (Johnson, 2000). If the
intended goal is to entertain, we may not direct the required attention to self-monitor accurately.
For example, the criterion used to recall the author of an article you recently read is laxer when
trying to impress non-academic friends than when talking to scholars at an academic conference.
Other factors that influence S.M. errors' frequency include ease of generating information
(Johnson & Raye, 1981), quality of initially encoded memory, and temporal distance between the
encoding of memory and retrieval of the source. Newer memories are thought to be more vivid
than older memories and contain more detailed memory characteristics.
Additionally, similar to event memory, the temporal distance between encoding and
retrieving the source makes it more difficult to pinpoint the event's specific timeframe (Neisser
1982). Finally, failure to recognize the memory source occurs in similar ways that people fail to
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recognize stimuli during a perception task. When the source is unfamiliar, or the perception
details are degraded, there is an increase in S.M. errors (Mitchell, 2009)
Accuracy on an S.M. task is increased when the evaluated statement comes from an expected
schema-consistent source (Mather et al., 1999; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005). However, there is
debate whether people are better at remembering schema-consistent sources. When deciding
between two sources, people are biased to guess a source that fits their expectations of who
would make that statement (Bayen et al., 2000). Additionally, the MPT model suggests that
people use newly learned information to make source attribution for information they could not
remember. In a study by Ehrenberg and Klaur (2005), participants learned either 75%
positive/25% negative or 25% positive/75% negative traits about two new sources. When asked
to make source attributions, participants were more likely to respond with the "good guy" if the
unremembered trait is positive. This problem is compounded when the original information is
poorly encoded because people are more likely to guess the source in those situations.
Source-monitoring errors can have serious real-world consequences partly due to our
vulnerability to suggestion. Misleading suggestions about previously-witness events cause
people to make more S.M. errors than those who were not biased (Loftus, 1979). Additionally, in
a classic study by Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995), participants recalled a false childhood
experience after being told to think about that suggested false event in-between interviews.
Finally, S.M. errors can lead to eyewitness identification errors during situations where memory
misattribution takes place.
The Three Distinctions of Veracity Judgments
Statements made by an individual may be true or may be false. When the statement is
made, the person may intentionally convey true or false information or unintentionally convey
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true or false information (see Figure 1). The traditional lie detection (e.g., truth-default theory)
and lie production (IMT2) literature primarily described the distinction between intentionally
truthful and intentionally false statements (top two circles). Meanwhile, the traditional source
monitoring framework primarily focuses on describing how people distinguish between
intentionally truthful and unintentionally false statements (top left circle versus bottom right
circle). However, even with these distinctions accounted for, there is a critical piece to fully
understanding how people evaluate statement credibility. Specifically, there are cases where one
might know that a statement is false but may be unsure whether the false statement is intentional
or unintentional (top right circle versus bottom right circle). One example of this situation is
perjury trials, where known false statements must be evaluated for intent and materiality
(Tiersma, 1989). Currently, only research on alibi generation even indirectly investigates this
distinction, and even this research is only tangentially related. In the following section, I will
discuss the alibi generation and evaluation research findings. Additionally, I propose a testable
set of propositions based on lie detection theories that we will test through a series of empirical
studies.

Alibis. Within the legal system, when suspects are accused of crimes, they often have an
opportunity to provide an alibi. In legal settings, an alibi refers to "a defense that places the
defendant at the relevant time of the crime in a different place than the scene involved and so
removed from there as to render it impossible for one to be the guilty party" (Nolan, 1990). More
simply, alibis provide the suspect with an opportunity to prove that they were at a different
location when the crime occurred and thus dismissed as a suspect (Olson & Wells, 2004).
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Courts and prosecutors believe that generating alibis should be relatively easy to
construct (Williams v. Florida, 1970). However, research suggests that generating a convincing
alibi can prove challenging even under seemly ideal circumstances (Olson & Wells, 2004).
Strong alibis increase the perceived credibility and honesty of the suspect. However, weak alibis
are met with skepticism and may increase the suspect's perceived guiltiness (Olson and Wells,
2012). In approximately two-thirds of cases that involved a DNA exoneration, innocent suspects'
alibis were not believed, and "the prosecution used weak alibis" as incriminating evidence (Olsen
& Wells, 2004). Given these findings, it is important to understand how alibis are generated,
evaluated and how memory errors influence alibis.

How Do People Know When a False Statement is a Lie?

One question that has not been thoroughly investigated is how people classify known
false statements as an intentional lie or an "honest" mistake. This question is important because it
helps us better understand a missing piece to effective interpersonal communication.
Additionally, this distinction has critical legal implications, including how jurors evaluate
witness creditability and perjury evidence. This research aims to test a framework that explains
this unanswered research question. The framework is based on the deception detection, deception
production, source monitoring, and alibi literature described above.

Non-verbal Cues. Traditional lie detection literature suggests that non-verbal cues (e.g.,
averting their gaze) are relied upon when judging statement veracity (Global Deception Research
Team, 2006). While non-verbal cues to deception are weakly correlated with actual deceit, they
may provide insight into how people classify known false statements as a deliberate lie or an
honest mistake (e.g., memory error). I anticipate that in interactions where little-to-no non-verbal
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cues to deception (e.g., averting gaze) are present, people are more likely to judge a known false
statement as an honest mistake. My rationale for this prediction is based upon findings
supporting truth-default theory (TDT). According to TDT, communication between people is
believed to be honest unless a specific "trigger" to deception is activated (Levine, 2014).
Therefore, I anticipate that if non-verbal cues to deception accompany a blatantly false
statement, the suspicion threshold will be crossed, and the statement will be classified as a
deliberate lie. This is a bit of an extension to TDT because the statements I am examining are
known falsehoods. So rather than assuming truth in the absence of a specific “trigger” the
implication is that what people are assuming is a lack of intentionality in the absence of the
trigger.
Motivational. A 2nd factor that I predict influences the classification of known false
statements is the perceived motivation behind the false statement. I base this prediction on
findings in the alibi generation literature that suggests person corroborating evidence influences
an alibi's credibility and believability (Culhane & Hosch, 2004). Sworn testimony by a family
member (e.g., motivated other) is regarded as less credible and believable compared to that of a
stranger (nonmotivated other). Furthermore, 1/3rd of jury eligible participants believed that
individuals who have close social relationships would be more likely to lie (Marion & Burke,
2013).
Given these findings, I predict false statements that are about a close friend or family member
are more likely to be perceived to be deceptive than ones made about an acquaintance or
stranger. However, this effect may be influenced by how self-serving the false statement was.
Suppose a false statement was made about a family member, and that statement protected the
family member from a controversial situation. In that case, that statement might be more likely to
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be judged as a deliberate lie. Both IMT2 and ALLIED suggest that deceptive communication is
typically done as a last resort. Turner et al. (1975) proposed a set of motivations for everyday
deceptive behavior, including to a) to save face, (b) to manage relationships, (c) to exploit, (d) to
avoid tension or conflict, and (e) to control situations. Given this, I expect people will classify
statements as deliberate lies when the evaluator perceives that the person has one of these
motives (or perhaps some other motive) for intentionally lying. However, if the false statements
do not benefit the speaker or their close family or friends, that statement will be more likely to be
judged as an honest mistake.
Memorability of statement. A 3rd factor that I predict will influence how false
statements are evaluated is the false statement's perceived memorability. Previous research
suggests that people use a metacognitive strategy to reject or accept a previous event's
occurrence. Events are confidently rejected if (1) the event in question is deemed memorable,
and (2) they fail to retrieve a feature about the event (Strack & Bless, 1994). Metacognitive
awareness of others' memory may influence how false statements are perceived. I predict if a
false statement is perceived as memorable, it will be judged as a deliberate lie. If a false
statement is a type that people judge to be less memorable, people should be more likely to judge
it to be an honest mistake. A limitation of this approach may be the faulty belief that laypeople
have regarding memory. In a recent public opinion survey, 46.6% of laypeople believe memory
is permanent and does not change, and over 60% believe that memory operates like a video
camera (Simons and Chabris, 2011).
Reputational. The 4th factor that I propose influences how people classify deliberate lies
and honest mistakes is based on the ALLIED perspective of deception detection. According to
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ALLIED, when there is no individuating information available, veracity judgments are based
upon contextual information. Known false statements may be evaluated similarly. If a usually
trustworthy source makes a false statement, I propose that statement will be judged as an honest
mistake. However, if your cousin has a history of lying, you are more likely to judge their
statement as a deliberate lie. It is important to note that these proposed findings might interact
with the presence of non-verbal cues to deception.

The Current Study

My dissertation aims to determine the factors that are associated with classifying false statements
as honest mistakes or deliberate lies. This dissertation contains two experiments with varying
methodology that seek to answer this question. Experiment 1 is a diary study where participants
monitored their daily conversations for the occurrence of false statements. Participants then
classified these statements as either deliberate lies or an honest mistakes. Furthermore, I was
interested in determining why participants made that classification through a series of follow-up
questions. The second experiment was a semi-structured interview study where participants
described experiences where they encountered someone telling them a deliberate lie and an
honest mistake. These experiments are primarily exploratory, but I proposed hypotheses based
upon the literature reviewed above.

H1: Participants will perceive the presence of non-verbal cues to deception as a trigger to
deceptive behavior. Therefore, non-verbal cues to deception will be mentioned in a greater
proportion of deliberate lies than honest mistakes.
H2: Participants will use perceived motive to classify false statements. I expect
participants will be more likely to mention motive while describing deliberate lies than honest

20

mistakes. I also expect participants will mention that the transgressor of a false statement did not
have motivation to lie while describing honest mistakes.
H3: Participants will use information regarding the perceived memorability of the false
statement in order to classify the statement as an honest mistake or a deliberate lie. Difficult to
remember statements will be more likely to be classified as an honest mistake. Meanwhile, easy
to remember statements will be more likely to be classified as a deliberate lie.
H4: Participants will use information regarding the perceived reputation of the
transgressor to classify false statements as an honest mistake or a deliberate lie. False statements
made by those with a history of lying will be evaluated as a deliberate lie. Furthermore, false
statements made by those with no history of lying will be evaluated as an honest mistake. It is
also possible that more generic information about having a disreputable character may be
associated with judging a false statement to be a deliberate lie.
RQ: My primary research question is to identify the reasons that statements are classified
as either an honest mistake or deliberate lie.

Experiment 1

Method

Participants. Thirty-eight University of Arkansas undergraduates (Age: M = 21.87 years;
SD = 2.34) participated in the following study in exchange for extra credit. The majority of
participants were female (n = 37, 97.4 %). The majority of participants were Caucasian (68.4 %),
followed by Latinx (15.8%), Asian-Pacific Islander (7.9 %), and Black (7.9 %).
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Survey Day One. Participants received a Qualtrics survey that explained the purpose of
this study is to better understand how people interpret false statements in everyday
communication. More specifically, we asked participants to monitor their daily conversations for
25 days. Each day, participants reported if anyone made a false statement to them within the past
24 hours. If they indicated that a false statement was made, participants answered follow-up
questions, including whether they believed that the statement was a deliberate lie or an honest
mistake. To explain to participants what are counted as a deliberate lie, we instructed participants
"For a statement to be a deliberate lie, the statement must be explicitly false, the person making
the statement must know its false at the time they make it, and the person making the statement
must intend to deceive another person." To explain to participants what should be counted as an
honest mistake, we instructed participants "For a statement to be an honest mistake, the
statement must be explicitly false, but there was no intention to deceive and the person who said
it did not realize it was false at the time they said it. For instance, someone may simply make a
memory error or be confused about the facts or may have just misspoken".
Additionally, participants read examples of a deliberate lie and an honest mistake. After
reading the examples, participants described the difference between a deliberate lie and an honest
mistake in their own words. After that, participants were told, "Over the next 25 days, we will be
asking you to monitor your conversations for both deliberate lies and honest mistakes. We will
send you a survey each night and ask you a series of questions about your previous day".
Participants answered a demographic questionnaire and provided an email address to receive the
follow-up survey.
Follow-up Daily Survey. Participants completed a daily Qualtrics survey each night until
they have responded on 25 different days. Each night participants answered the following
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question, "In the past 24 hours did someone say something to you that you believe is false
(whether or not you realized it was false at the time)? The statement could be either a deliberate
lie or an honest mistake. So, say "Yes" if any false statement was made to you in the past 24
hours.". If participants respond yes, they described the false statement in as much detail as
possible. After describing the false statement, participants answered a series of follow-up
questions to gather additional information about the false statement (see Table 1). After
answering the follow-up questions, participants were asked, “if there were any other false
statements in the past 24 hours that they would like to report?”. If the participant answered “yes”,
the procedure described above was repeated. After responding to the survey for 25 days,
participants were thanked and debriefed about the nature of the study. We continued to follow up
with participants until they completed 25 days of surveys or participants no longer responded.
That is, if the participant forgot to respond to the survey one day, we just continued data
collection with that participant until all 25 days’ worth of data was collected. Thus, some
participants completed the experiment after 25 days, but some participants took somewhat longer
to complete the experiment. On average participants completed the survey within 29 days
(median = 26 days).
Coding. All responses were coded independently by three pairs of trained coders. Once
coding was complete, we calculated intercoder reliability (Kappa), and I resolved all
disagreements with a discussion between the trained coders. To start the coding process, I
developed a coding scheme for four theory-based coding categories related to my primary
hypotheses. Before the coding proceeded, I identified two additional categories, Verbal Cues,
and Failed Prediction. Therefore, the primary coding categories are as follows, 1. Non-verbal
cues (e.g., averting their gaze, increased movement of feet and legs); 2. Verbal Cues (e.g., admits
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lack of memory, spontaneous corrections), 3. Memorability (whether the false statement was
perceived to be easy or difficult to remember); 4. Motivational or Lack of Motivation (e.g., SelfServing); 5. Reputational (e.g., (a) Prior lying/truthfulness, (b) general good / bad character); and
6. Epistemic Paucity/Failed Prediction -- made a statement, but it's not the kind of thing that a
person could know for sure (e.g., it's going to rain tonight; Trump is going to win the election)
(See Table 1 for examples).
Table 1
Primary coding categories and examples based on participants responses
Categories
Examples
1. I know she didn't want to talk about it, wouldn't make
eye contact, and she always has a bit of a different
inflection in her voice when lying
Non-verbal
Cues

Verbal Cues

Motivational

2. I could tell by her body language that she was lying and
hiding something. She knows she isn’t allowed to have the
full tub of Nutella in her room, so she was trying to hide it.
1. I knew it was false because shortly after his
proclamation, he said he was kidding.
2. She told me the truth like 2 seconds later to correct
herself.
1. He was trying to be hurtful, had the intent of misleading
me so that I would not like her as much, but she helped
more than he did. Probably wanted to make himself look
better by comparison.
2. There's no reason for her to lie about that specific fact,
she just had the wrong information.

24

Table 1 Cont.
Primary coding categories and examples based on participants responses

Reputational

Memorability

Failed
Prediction

1. I knew it was a deliberate lie because I saw her texts,
and she has lied in the past.
2. Historically speaking, this individual is likely to not pay
others back even after promising to.
1. I thought it was an honest mistake because she simply
forgot that she made the appointment with the advisor for
that time. Therefore, she thought she did not know who
called her.
2. It was just a forgetful mistake.
1. I honestly believe this person truly thought Trump
would win again. As this person also explained that they
were so certain he would that they weren’t concerned
about voting. Clearly this isn’t true because no one can
predict that.
2. The speaker had checked all their tracking links for their
incoming packages and truly believed that no packages
would arrive for them until Sunday. Upon receiving the
packages, they realized that their statement had been false.

Additionally, each primary coding category contained several subcategories that were
coded for. To code the data, coders read participant's responses about what caused them to
classify a false statement as a deliberate lie or an honest mistake. After reading the participant's
response, the coders marked 0 (No) and 1 (Yes) on a separate data sheet to identify the presence
or absence of the six primary coding categories and the respective subcategories.
Results
Reliability of Coding Taxonomy. To assess inter-rater reliability, I computed Cohen's
kappa statistic using SPSS version 27. For all three pairs of coders there was moderate agreement
(pair 1: κ = 0.400, p < 0.000; pair 2: κ = 0.754, p < 0.000; pair 3: κ = 0.698, p < 0.001).
According to Cohen’s system for interpreting Kappa, the kappa for pair 1 indicates a fair amount
of agreement between the coders, and the kappas for pair 2 and 3 indicate substantial agreement
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between coders. 1After computing kappa, I sought clarification from coders on their
disagreements and resolved any differences.
Likelihood of Reporting False Statements. In this experiment, participants monitored
their everyday conversations for false statements for twenty-five days. The vast majority of
participants (n = 35, 92%) responded to the daily survey at least twenty times. There were 898
responses, and participants mentioned false statements on 163 days (15%). On average each
participant reported 4.3 false statements (median = 4; range 0 – 12). Of the 163 false statements
that were described, participants interpreted 81 to be honest mistakes (49.7%) and 82 to be
deliberate lies (50.3%). I was interested in whether participants changed their response patterns
as the diary study persisted. A correlation suggested that participants were less likely to report
false statements as the diary study persisted, r = - .161, p < .001. To further investigate this
finding, I split study days into quartiles and conducted a one-way ANOVA to test any
differences. Participants reported more false statements during the first quartile (days 1-6: M =
30.16) than the second (days 7-14: M = 13.27), third (days 14-20: M = 11.48), or fourth quartiles
(days 21 – survey end: M = 14.85), F (3, 890) = 12.73, p < .001. There was no other difference in
response patterns. This effect may reflect fatigue with the process of keeping a daily diary.
Perceived Trustworthiness. I was interested in whether participants adjusted their future
trust depending on whether participants perceived a deliberate lie or an honest mistake. I used the
survey item, "After this interaction, how likely are you to trust the person who made the false
statement?" as the dependent variable on the following analysis. An independent samples t-test
suggested that participants are more likely to trust those who made an honest mistake (M = 4.16,

“Cohen suggested the Kappa result be interpreted as follows: values ≤ 0 as indicating no agreement and 0.01–0.20
as none to slight, 0.21–0.40 as fair, 0.41– 0.60 as moderate, 0.61–0.80 as substantial, and 0.81–1.00 as almost
perfect agreement.” (McHugh, 2012)
1
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SD = 1.08, SE = .12) than those who told a deliberate lie (M = 3.26, SD = 1.35, SE = .15), t (161)
= - 4.704, p < .001.
Perceived Seriousness. I was interested in whether participants perceived the seriousness
of a deliberate lie or an honest mistake differently. I used the survey item, "How serious do you
view the severity of the false statement?" as the dependent variable on the following analysis. An
independent samples t-test suggested that participants view deliberate lies as more serious (M =
1.95, SD = 1.05, SE = .11) than honest mistakes (M = 1.37, SD = .64, SE = .07), t (161) = 4.247,
p < .001.
Certainty. I was interested in whether participants' certainty that the statement was false
statement was different for a deliberate lie as opposed to honest mistakes. I used the survey item,
"How certain are you that the statement was false?" as the dependent variable on the following
analysis. An independent samples t-test suggested that there was no significant difference in the
certainty of a deliberate lie (M = 1.95, SD = 1.05, SE = .11) and honest mistake (M = 1.37, SD =
.64, SE = .07), t (161) = 4.247, p < .001.
Primary Analyses. To test my four primary hypotheses, I was interested in whether nonverbal cues, memorability, reputation cues, and motivation cues differentiated deliberate lies and
honest mistakes. To investigate this, I analyzed my data using Fisher's exact test (Bower, 2003)
to look at associations between these categories and whether it occurred more often in honest
mistakes or deliberate lies. I used Fisher's exact test because it is appropriate for small cell sizes
and is a more conservative test statistic that minimizes type one error.
Non-verbal Cues. My first hypothesis was that participants would describe non-verbal
cues to deception more often for deliberate lies than honest mistakes. The presence of non-verbal
cues to deception was significantly more associated with deliberate lies (M = .20, SD = .40) than
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honest mistakes (M = .01, SD = .11), p < .001. I followed up this analysis by investigating if
there were specific non-verbal cues most associated with deliberate lies. I found that voice
change was associated with deliberate lies (M = .07, SD = .26) more than an honest mistake (M =
.0, SD = .0), p = .028. No other non-verbal cues had a significant association (See table 2 for the
full list of categories and analyses)
Table 2
Experiment One. Descriptive and test statistics for Non-verbal cues and the
appropriate subcategories
Categories
N
M
SD
Exact
Non-verbal Cues
17
.10
.31
p < .001
Deliberate Lie
16
.20
.40
Honest Mistake
1
.01
.11
Pauses
1
.01
.08
p = 1.00
Deliberate Lie
1
.01
.11
Honest Mistake
0
Poor eye contact
2
.01
.11
p = .497
Deliberate Lie
2
.02
.16
Honest Mistake
0
Nervous looking
4
.03
.16
p = .620
Deliberate Lie
3
.04
.19
Honest Mistake
1
.01
.11
Voice Change
6
.04
.19
p = .028
Deliberate Lie
6
.07
.26
Honest Mistake
0
0
0
Rate of Speaking
0
0
0
Deliberate Lie
0
0
0
Honest Mistake
0
0
0

Motivational. My second hypothesis was that participants would be more likely to
describe motivational factors when describing deliberate lies than honest mistakes. Motivational
cues were significantly associated with deliberate lies (M = .50, SD = .56) more than honest
mistakes (M = .27, SD = .48), p = .003. Participants were more likely to mention motivation to
lie when describing a deliberate lie (M = .38, SD = .49) than an honest mistake (M = .03, SD =
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.16). Also, participants were more likely to mention no motivation to lie when describing an
honest mistake (M = .13, SD = .34) than a deliberate lie (M = .01, SD = .11). Finally, participants
were more likely to mention the statement was self-serving when describing a deliberate lie (M =
.17, SD = .38) than an honest mistake (M = .0, SD = .0). There were no other types of
motivational cues that were associated with honest mistakes or deliberate lies (See table 3 for the
full list of categories and analyses).
Table 3
Experiment One. Descriptive and test statistics for Motivation cues and the
appropriate subcategories
Categories
N
M
SD
Exact
Motivation to lie (general)
63
.31
.46
p = .003
Deliberate Lie
41
.50
.50
Honest Mistake
22
.27
.33
Motivated to lie?
33
.20
.40
p < .001
Deliberate Lie
31
.38
.49
Honest Mistake
2
.03
.16
Not motivated to lie?
21
.13
.34
p < .001
Deliberate Lie
1
.01
.11
Honest Mistake
20
.25
.43
Self-serving
14
.09
.28
p < .001
Deliberate Lie
14
.17
.38
Honest Mistake
0
0
0
Detrimental to self
2
.01
.11
p = .497
Deliberate Lie
2
.02
.16
Honest Mistake
0
0
0

Memorability. My third hypothesis was that participants would use information about
perceived memorability to classify statements as deliberate lies and honest mistakes. Perceived
memorability was significantly associated more with honest mistakes (M = .28, SD = .45) than
deliberate lies (M = .07, SD = .26), p < .001. More specifically, participants associated difficult
to remember statements with honest mistake (M = .14, SD = .35) more than a deliberate lie (M =
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.0, SD = .0). There were no other memorability cues associated with honest mistakes or
deliberate lies (See table 4 for the full list of categories and analyses)
Table 4
Experiment One. Descriptive and test statistics for Memorability cues and
the appropriate subcategories
Categories
N
M
SD
Exact
Perceived Memorability
29
.18
.38
p < .001
Deliberate Lie
6
.07
.26
Honest Mistake
23
.28
.45
Difficult to remember
11
.07
.25
p < .001
Deliberate Lie
0
0
0
Honest Mistake
11
.14
.35
Easy to remember
5
.03
.17
p = .367
Deliberate Lie
4
.05
.22
Honest Mistake
1
.01
.11

Reputation. My fourth hypothesis was that participants would use information about the
perceived reputation of the transgressor to classify statements as deliberate lies and honest
mistakes. Overall, Reputation cues were only marginally more likely to be mentioned for
deliberate lies (M = .17, SD = .33) than honest mistakes (M = .07, SD = .26), p = .093. However,
participants were more likely to mention the history of prior lying when describing a deliberate
lie (M = .12, SD = .33) than an honest mistake (M = .01, SD = .11). No other reputational cues
were associated with honest mistakes or deliberate lies (See table 5 for the full list of categories
and analyses)
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Table 5
Experiment One. Descriptive and test statistics for Reputational cues and the
appropriate subcategories
Categories
N
M
SD
Exact
Reputational
20
.12
.33
p = .093
Deliberate Lie
14
.17
.33
Honest Mistake
6
.07
.26
Prior Lying
11
.07
.25
p = .009
Deliberate Lie
10
.12
.33
Honest Mistake
1
.01
.11
Prior Truthfulness
2
.01
.11
p = 1.00
Deliberate Lie
1
.01
.11
Honest Mistake
1
.01
.11
Good Character
1
.01
.08
p = .497
Deliberate Lie
0
Honest Mistake
1
.01
.11
Bad Character
3
.02
.14
p =.245
Deliberate Lie
3
.04
.19
Honest Mistake
0
0
0

Exploratory Analyses. Based on my preliminary coding, I identified the presence of two
additional categories, failed predictions and verbal cues. I aimed to test whether these categories
helped differentiate deliberate lies and honest mistakes.
Failed Predictions. A failed prediction is a false statement in which the person made a
claim about a future event, and that future event did not occur (e.g., “It is going to rain tonight”).
Because the future is never perfectly predictable, it is reasonable that people would treat these
false statements as honest mistakes rather than deliberate lies. Failed predictions were
significantly associated with honest mistakes (M = .32, SD = .47) more than deliberate lies (M =
.04, SD = .19), p < .001.
Verbal Cues. The presence of Verbal cues was not significantly associated with
deliberate lies (M = .09, SD = .28) or honest mistakes (M = .10, SD = .31), p = .454.
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Furthermore, no specific verbal cues were associated with honest mistakes or deliberate lies (See
table 6 for full analyses)
Table 6
Experiment One. Descriptive and test statistics for Verbal cues and the
appropriate subcategories
Categories
N
M
SD
Exact
Verbal Cues
17
.10
.31
p = .454
Deliberate Lie
7
.09
.28
Honest Mistake
10
.12
.33
Admits lack of memory
6
.04
.19
p = .117
Deliberate Lie
1
.01
.11
Honest Mistake
5
.06
.24
Spontaneous Corrections
8
.05
.22
p = .495
Deliberate Lie
3
.04
.19
Honest Mistake
5
.06
.24

Experiment 2
Results from Experiment 1 revealed that participants used different cues to differentiate between
deliberate lies and honest mistakes. Participants associated perceived memorability with honest
mistakes and both non-verbal cues and motivation with deliberate lies. In Experiment 2, I
attempted to replicate these using a novel format. Second, I designed Experiment 2 to allow
myself to investigate whether any of the hypothesized predictors influenced the initial decision
and/or final decision about statement veracity. Finally, in Experiment 2, participants are asked to
describe false statements from any point of their lives. Potentially false statements that are most
memorable may differ in nature compared to those that were described in Experiment 1.

Method

Participants. Fifty University of Arkansas undergraduates (Age: M = 20.56 years; SD =
1.92) participated in the following study in exchange for extra credit or fulfilling a course
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requirement. The majority of participants were female (n = 36,72 %). The majority of
participants were Caucasian (76%), followed by Latinx (14%), Asian-Pacific Islander (6%), and
Black (5.4%).
Procedure. Participants completed a semi-structured interview via Zoom, talking to a
researcher about their life experiences. The interviewer, a psychology undergraduate research
assistant, began the session by sending a Qualtrics survey containing a demographic
questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire, the research assistant asked for the
participant's consent to record the interview and subsequently began the task. After this, the
interviewer read the participant the following instructions:
In the following task, we will ask you a series of questions regarding deliberate
lies and honest mistakes. For a statement to be a deliberate lie, the statement must
be explicitly false, the person making the statement must know it's false at the time they make it,
and person making the statement must intend to deceive another person. An example of
a deliberate lie includes, "Employee tells their boss that they are missing work because they are
sick. Really, they are not sick but just wanted to go to a baseball game." For a statement to be an
honest mistake, the statement must be explicitly false, but there was no intention to deceive, and
the person who said it did not realize it was false at the time they said it. For instance, someone
may simply make a memory error or be confused about the facts or may have just misspoken. An
example of an honest mistake includes, "Jim tells his spouse that he never met Jenny. It turns out
that Jim and Jenny went to school together, but Jim just honestly forgot."
Following this, the interviewer asked participants to "please describe the difference
between a deliberate lie and an honest mistake?". If participants could not describe the difference
between a deliberate lie and an honest mistake, the research assistant described the difference for

33

the participant and re-asked the question. The interviewer then asked participants a series of
questions regarding false statements and deliberate lies. The first question asked by the
interviewer was, “Please describe in as much detail as possible a false statement that was made
to you that you believed was a deliberate lie.”. After answering this question, participants were
asked follow-up questions to gather additional information about the described event. The
follow-up questions were, 1.“How certain are you that the statement was false?”, 2.“What
convinced you that the statement was false?”, 3. “How seriously do you view the severity of the
false statement?”, 4. “How difficult do you think it was for the other person who told the false
statement to recall the correct information?”, and 5. “After this interaction, how likely are you
to trust the person who made the false statement?”. These follow-up questions were asked after
each of the following questions. The 2nd question asked by the interviewer was, “Please
describe in as much detail as possible a false statement that was made to you that you believed
was an honest mistake.”. After this, the interviewer asked, “Was there a time where you believed
a false statement was a deliberate lie, but later turned out to be an honest mistake? If so, please
describe in as much detail as possible”. The final question asked by the interviewer was, “Was
there a time where you believed a false statement was an honest mistake, but later turned out to
be a deliberate lie? If so, please describe in as much detail as possible.”. After the completion of
the interview, the interviewer thanked and debriefed the participants. On average the interview
took approximately 15 minutes.
Coding. All videos were coded independently by trained coders (blind to the hypotheses)
using the same coding scheme developed for experiment one. Once coding was complete, I
calculated intercoder reliability (Kappa), and I resolved all disagreements with a discussion
between the trained coder.
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Results
Reliability of Coding Taxonomy. To assess inter-rater reliability, I computed Cohen's
kappa statistic using SPSS version 27. Two pairs of coders there had fair agreement (pair 1: κ =
0.339, p < 0.000; pair 2: κ = 0.249, p < 0.000; pair 3: κ = 0.615, p < 0.001) (Landis, Koch, 1977).
Due to the relatively low kappa, I calculated the overall agreement rate for all three coders.
Overall, the agreement between the coders were high (pair 1 = 94.8%; pair 2 = 96.2%; pair 3=
98.11%). One explanation for the paradox is the relatively low prevalence rate of the coded
behaviors (Viera and Garret, 2005)
After computing the reliability ratings, I sought clarification from the coders on disagreements
and resolved any differences.
Primary Analyses. To test the four primary hypotheses, I conducted four logistic
regressions using non-verbal cues, memorability, reputational cues, and motivation cues as
separate outcome variables. Additionally, I conducted two exploratory logistic regressions using
verbal cues and failed predictions as different outcome variables. In the regression model, initial
statement belief (Deliberate lie, Honest mistake), final statement belief (Deliberate lie, Honest
mistake), and the interaction term were predictor variables. The reference category for both
predictor variables was deliberate lies.
Non-verbal Cues. My first hypothesis was that participants would describe non-verbal
cues more often for deliberate lies than honest mistakes. To test this, I conducted a logistic
regression on the first dependent variable, the proportion of non-verbal cues reported. A test of
the full model was significant, χ2 = 11.45, df = 3, p = .010. SPSS took six iterations to converge
on a solution. The goodness of fit test was not significant, p = 1.00. The effect of final statement
belief was significant, b = - 1.43, S.E. = .68, Wald χ2(1) = 5.51, p = .019, OR = .20, CI 95%
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[.053 - .77]. Deliberate lies (M = .18, SE = .04) were more likely to include non-verbal cues to
deception than statements about honest mistakes (M = .05, SE =.02). Both initial statement belief
and the interaction term were not significant predictors, p > .05.

Motivation. My second hypothesis was that participants would be more likely to
describe motivational factors when describing deliberate lies than honest mistakes. To test this, I
conducted a logistic regression on the second dependent variable, the proportion of motivational
cues reported. A test of the full model was significant, χ2 = 28.79, df = 3, p < .001. SPSS took
five iterations to converge on a solution. The goodness of fit test was not significant, p = 1.00.
The effect of final statement belief was significant, b = - 2.09 S.E. = .67, Wald χ2(1) = 9.83, p =
.002, OR = .12, CI 95% [.03 - .46]. Participants were more likely to mention motivational cues
while describing statements perceived as deliberate lies (M = .37, SE = .05) than statements
about honest mistakes (M = .07, SE =.03). Both initial statement belief and the interaction term
were not significant predictors, p > .05.

Memorability. My third hypothesis was that participants would use information about
perceived memorability to classify statements as deliberate lies and honest mistakes. To test this,
I conducted a logistic regression on the third dependent variable, the proportion of memorability
cues reported. A test of the full model was significant, χ2 = 17.71, df = 3, p < .001 SPSS took 7
iterations to converge on a solution. The goodness of fit test was not significant, p = 1.00. The
effect of final statement belief was marginally significant, b = 1.90 S.E. = 1.10, Wald χ2(1) =
2.98, p = .084, OR = 6.68, CI 95% [.78 – 57.70]. Statements describing honest mistakes (M =
.21, SE = .04) were marginally more likely to include perceived memorability than statements
about deliberate lies (M = .07, SE =.04). The effect of initial statement belief was marginally
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significant, b = 1.90 S.E. = 1.10, Wald χ2(1) = 2.98, p = .084, OR = 6.68, CI 95% [.78 – 57.70].
Statements describing honest mistakes (M = .21, SE = .04) were marginally more likely to
include perceived memorability than statements about deliberate lies (M = .07, SE =.03). To
further test my hypothesis, I conducted a logistic regression on the dependent variable, the
proportion of difficult to remember memory cues reported. When I included the interaction term,
the model failed to converge. Therefore, my regression model included initial statement belief
(Deliberate lie, Honest mistake) and final statement belief (Deliberate lie, Honest mistake).
A test of the full model was significant, χ2 = 21.07, df = 2, p < .001 SPSS took 7 iterations to
converge on a solution. The goodness of fit test was not significant, p = 1.00. The effect of final
statement belief was significant, b = 2.23 S.E. = .76, Wald χ2(1) = 8.27, p = .004, OR = 9.30, CI
95% [2.03 – 42.52]). Statements describing honest mistakes (M = .15, SE = .04) were more
likely to include perceived memorability than statements about deliberate lies (M = .02, SE
=.01). The effect of initial statement belief was significant, b = 1.75 S.E. = .67, Wald χ2(1) =
6.87, p = .009, OR = 5.73, CI 95% [1.55 – 21.12]. Statements describing honest mistakes (M =
.14, SE = .04) were more likely to include difficult to remember memory cues than statements
about deliberate lies (M = .03, SE =.02). There were not enough reported instances where
participants described easy to remember cues to conduct further analyses.
Reputation. My fourth hypothesis was that participants would use information about the
perceived reputation of the transgressor to classify statements as deliberate lies and honest
mistakes. To test this, I conducted a logistic regression on the fourth dependent variable, the
proportion of reputational cues reported. A test of the full model was not significant, χ2 = 3.389,
df = 3, p = .335. SPSS took 7 iterations to converge on a solution. The goodness of fit test was
not significant, p = 1.00. Initial statement belief, final statement belief, and the interaction were
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not significant predictors, p > .05. To further investigate this effect, I conducted a logistic
regression on the proportion of prior history of lying reported. A test of the full model was not
significant, χ2 = 6.040, df = 3, p = .110 SPSS was unable to converge on a solution. The
goodness of fit test was not significant, p = 1.00. Initial statement belief, final statement belief,
and the interaction were not significant predictors, p > .05. Since the regression was unable to
converge, I tested the model without the interaction term. A test of the full model was not
significant, χ2 = 1.184, df = 2, p = .553. SPSS took 6 iterations to converge on a solution. The
goodness of fit test was not significant, p = .16. Initial statement belief and final statement belief
were not significant predictors, p > .05
Verbal Cues. I conducted a logistic regression on the fifth dependent variable, the
proportion of verbal cues reported. A test of the full model was not significant, χ2 = 4.34, df = 3,
p = .227 SPSS took 6 iterations to converge on a solution. The goodness of fit test was not
significant, p = 1.00. The interaction was marginally significant, b = 2.12 S.E. = 1.11, Wald χ2(1)
= 3.66, p = .056, OR = 8.35, CI 95% [.95 - 73.44]. Initial statement belief and final statement
belief were not significant predictors, p > .05.
Failed Prediction. A test of the full model was not significant, χ2 = 19.638, df = 3, p <
.001 SPSS took 20 iterations and was unable to converge on a solution. The goodness of fit test
was not significant, p = 1.00. Initial belief, end belief, and the interaction were not significant.
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Table 7
Experiment Two. Descriptive statistics for primary
coding categories
N
M
Categories
Non-verbal Cues
Deliberate Lie
12
.24
Honest Mistake
2
.04
Deliberate lie to Honest Mistake
3
.06
Honest Mistake to Deliberate Lie 6
.12
Verbal Cues
Deliberate Lie
7
.14
Honest Mistake
6
.12
Deliberate lie to Honest Mistake
2
.04
Honest Mistake to Deliberate Lie 3
.06
Perceived Memorability
Deliberate Lie
1
.07
Honest Mistake
15
.28
Deliberate lie to Honest Mistake
6
.12
Honest Mistake to Deliberate Lie 6
.12
Motivation to lie (general)
Deliberate Lie
17
.34
Honest Mistake
4
.08
Deliberate lie to Honest Mistake
3
.06
Honest Mistake to Deliberate Lie 20
.40
Reputational
Deliberate Lie
4
.08
Honest Mistake
1
.02
Deliberate lie to Honest Mistake
5
.10
Honest Mistake to Deliberate Lie 4
.08
Failed Prediction
Deliberate Lie
0
.00
Honest Mistake
8
.16
Deliberate lie to Honest Mistake
1
.02
Honest Mistake to Deliberate Lie 0
.00
General Discussion
In this study, I was interested in how people determine whether a false statement should be
classified as an honest mistake or a deliberate lie. The research question asked for this
dissertation was novel and serves as an important contribution to the growing literature on the
broader field of deception detection. Previous research involving deception detection has
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exclusively focused on the lie vs. truthful statement dichotomy. In this dissertation, I reviewed
the deception detection, alibi generation, and source monitoring literature. I then identified a
framework based on an initial set of variables that I hypothesized would impact the classification
of deliberates lies vs. honest mistakes. I developed an exploratory coding scheme containing six
primary categories and several subcategories to test this proposed framework. I used this coding
scheme to classify participants' responses across two experiments.
The first experiment I conducted was a diary study that had participants monitor their
everyday conversations for false statements. Participants who reported hearing a false statement
were asked a series of questions, including being asked to describe their rationale for deciding
whether the false statement was an honest mistake or a deliberate lie. Trained research assistants
coded the participants' responses for the presence of the six primary categories and their
respective subcategories.
In Experiment 2, participants completed a semi-structured interview with a trained
research assistant about previous times that the participant was lied to. Interviewers asked
participants to describe events when someone told them deliberate lies and honest mistakes.
Interviewers asked participants to explain the rationale for why they decided that the statement
was false. Afterward, trained research assistants watched video recordings of the interviews and
coded the participants' responses for the presence of the six primary categories and their
respective subcategories
Both experiments revealed that participants used different cues to classify statements as a
deliberate lie or an honest mistake. In the general discussion, I will discuss how these findings
reconciled with my primary hypotheses. Additionally, I will discuss the general pattern of data,
including how participants emphasized different categories for both kinds of false statements. I
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will describe the theoretical implications of the findings. Finally, I will discuss the limitations of
dissertations and the future directions for research investigating the honest mistake vs. deliberate
lie dichotomy.
Non-verbal Cues. Previous research investigating lie detection suggests that people use
non-verbal cues when determining if communication is deceptive (Global Deception Team,
2006). Since these findings were confined to the true-false dichotomy, I was interested in testing
whether participants used the same cues to make decisions about the intent of false statements. I
hypothesized participants would indicate the presence of non-verbal cues when describing
deliberate lies more than describing honest mistakes. Results from both Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2 supported this hypothesis. Participants described non-verbal cues as their reason
why the false statement was a deliberate lie more than they did to describe the false statement
was an honest mistake. Interestedly, there was not one specific type of non-verbal cue that was
mentioned by participants in more than 7% of deliberate lies. Participants were often vague
while describing non-verbal cues, and when more specific, the specific cue varied from
participant to participant. This result was initially surprising because I anticipated that there
would be a clear pattern to the non-verbal cues reported as deceptive.
However, after looking closer at the literature, I found a rationale for why specific non-verbal
cues are sparsely reported. As stated above, past research investigating the truth/lie dichotomy
suggests that non-verbal cues are believed by others to indicate lying. However, there is little
agreement regarding specific non-verbal cues being associated with deceptive behavior (Global
Deception Team, 2006). Specific non-verbal cues, except for gaze aversion were believed to
indicate lying by under 40% of participants. Therefore, the pattern of responding that I had in my
study aligns with the previous literature that invested the truth-lie distinction. Overall, the result
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from both experiments provides evidence that non-verbal cues are used when people make
judgments about deliberate lies but are rarely used when classifying a statement as an honest
mistake. This finding may have significant legal implications regarding cases of perjury. In these
situations, a juror may only look for non-verbal cues associated with deception. Therefore, signs
of nervousness including but not limited to looking away may cause an increase in perceived
guiltiness. In the future direction section, I will discuss how non-verbal cues can be investigated
further when paired with motive and perceived memorability.
Motivation. Previous research investigating motive has primarily been studied in the
context of alibi generation. According to this literature, alibis are considered less credible and
less believable when the alibi contains a perceived motive to protect oneself or others. In this
dissertation, I was interested in whether the perceived motive was used to classify known false
statements as a deliberate lie or an honest mistake. I hypothesized that participants would use
information about the perceived motive when classifying false statements. In Experiment 1,
participants described motive as the reason for their classification for approximately 40% of all
false statements. While describing deliberate lies, roughly half of all participants described
motivation to lie as the reason why they made that classification. Compared to all categories
coded for during this dissertation, motivation to lie was the category that was mentioned by the
most participants. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2.
Additionally, motive was also associated with deliberate lies. In Experiment 1, participants
described the transgressor of the false statement as not having motivation to lie in over 20% of
honest mistakes. However, Experiment 2 did not replicate this finding. Potentially participants
are less likely to recall details about motive when describing honest mistakes that occurred in the
distant past.
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Taken together, the findings from both experiments suggest motive plays an influential role is
how people classify known false statements. Motive influenced both the perception of deliberate
lies and honest mistakes. In particular, deliberate lies were commonly considered self-serving.
An informal investigation of the data suggests that self-serving statements were often used as a
way to save face and to manage relationships. These reasons are consistent with Turner et al.
(1975) proposed a set of motivations for everyday deceptive behavior. In my future directions, I
will discuss ways researchers can test whether motive mediates the relationship that other
categories have on the classification of false statements.
Memorability. Memory errors are considered a special kind of honest mistake that
involves an unintended failure to recall information. These circumstances may be explained by a
source-monitoring mistake (Johnson et al. 1993). In my dissertation, I investigated whether
information regarding the perceived memorability of false statements is used to decide if the
statement was a memory error (honest mistake) or a deliberate lie. I predicted that participants
would be likely to describe honest mistakes as difficult to remember. Additionally, I anticipated
participants would describe the deliberate lies as easy to remember. In both experiments, the
results only partially supported my hypothesis. Participants mentioned an honest mistake being
difficult to remember 14% of the time. However, participants rarely classified a statement as a
deliberate lie because a statement was judged as easy to remember. Overall, this finding suggests
that participants will make use of perceived memorability only when the false statement is
deemed as difficult to remember. One challenge related to perceived memorability is that most
people believe that memory operates as a video recorder (Simons and Chabris, 2011). Even so,
this finding suggests that memorability of a perceived false statement does influence whether a
statement is classified as an honest mistake. In my future directions I will discuss what
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implications this has for future research investigating the honest mistake vs. deliberate lie
distinction.
Reputation. According to traditional lie detection research, people use the base rate of
prior lying to judge whether a statement is likely to be true or false (Street, 2014). For instance,
people may expect politicians to lie to them, but not a Catholic nun. In this study, I hypothesized
that the perceived reputation of the transgressor of the false statement would influence whether it
was classified as a deliberate lie or an honest mistake. The results from my dissertation only
partially supported this hypothesis. If the participant classified the statement as a deliberate lie,
they were more likely to mention that the transgressor has a previous history of lying. However,
when participants classified the statement as an honest mistake, they did not use previous history
of truthful behavior to classify the statement. Furthermore, general characteristics about
individuals, such as having good or bad character, did not influence the categorization of false
statements. Potentially, this result is explained because people operate under a truth-default state
(Levine, 2014). Therefore, only information that makes people question the truth-default state
would be deemed relevant.
Overall Categorization. In addition to comparing the factors that differentiate how
people compare deliberate lies and honest mistakes, I wanted to determine which of my proposed
categories are most prevalent when describing deliberate lies and honest mistakes. Participants
described their rationale for categorizing a false statement as either a deliberate lie or an honest
mistake. Afterward, my team of research assistants coded the participants' responses. After
investigating the data from both experiments, I identified two distinct patterns.
Participants were most likely to mention motive, non-verbal cues, history of lying as the reason
they classified a false statement as a deliberate lie. Meanwhile, participants used information
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regarding the perceived memorability and lack of motive to classify a statement as an honest
mistake. Overall, these two patterns of responding are relatively unique. Across the four
categories that I hypothesized influences the categorization of false statements, only motive
influences the categorization of both deliberate lies and honest mistakes. In the next section, I
will discuss the theoretical ramifications of the findings discussed above and then discuss future
research to further investigate the two patterns described above.
Theoretical Implication
The findings from this study have important theoretical ramifications. First, it provides
support for a subset of theories I discussed during the introduction. Second, these findings serve
as a building block to further refine a theoretical model that can disentangle how people classify
deliberate lies and false statements.
Deliberate Lies. According to truth-default theory, communication operates under the
assumption that others are inherently honest unless a "trigger" is activated (Levine, 2014). In
experiment one, participants reported relatively few false statements during the 25-day diary
study. This finding is aligned with the general idea that people are "truth-biased" when
evaluating the veracity of statements. Additional evidence for truth-default theory is that only
49% of the described false statements were initially perceived as a false statement. Of these false
statements, approximately 65% were classified as deliberate lies, while 35% were classified as
honest mistakes. One potential distinguishing factor for whether a deliberate lie is perceived right
away is the presence of non-verbal cues. In experiment one, participants described the presence
of non-verbal cues in 23.1% of deliberate lies that were known right away. Meanwhile,
participants described the presence of non-verbal cues in 13.3% of deliberate lies that were
discovered after the fact. A similar pattern of results occurred in Experiment 2 when I compared
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statements that participants knew were deliberate lies to deliberate lies participants originally
thought were honest mistakes. Taken together, this pattern of results demonstrates further
evidence for TDT. Non-verbal cues operated as a "trigger" that caused participants to be more
likely to conclude the false statement was deliberate.
Another finding that has theoretical ramifications is that participants rely on using motive more
often to classify false statements as deliberate lies than honest mistakes. Across both
experiments' participants mentioned motive over 40% of the time as their reason that they
classified a statement as a deliberate lie. One explanation for this finding is that participants in
this study were sensitive to situational factors associated with lying. This finding suggests that
when a statement is classified as a false statement, people use Turner et al. (1975) proposed a set
of motivations for everyday deceptive behavior, including to a) to save face, (b) to manage
relationships, (c) to exploit, (d) to avoid tension or conflict, and (e) to control situations as a way
to classify a statement as a deliberate lie or honest mistake.
Honest Mistakes. Unlike deliberate lies, perceived memorability was an important
predictor of honest mistakes. When a statement was assumed to be difficult to remember,
participants classified the false statement as an honest mistake. Additionally, in Experiment 2
participants were more likely to mention perceived memorability when discussing statements
participants always knew were honest mistakes (28%) than statements participants initially
thought was a deliberate lie that later turned out to be an honest mistake. This finding suggests
that participants often think about the memorability of a false statement once it is encountered.
Potentially these findings are limited to people who believe in the fallibility of memory. Previous
research suggests that over 60% believe that memory operates like a video camera (Simons &
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Chabris, 2011). Therefore, perceived memorability may be more influential if participants are
aware of the fallibility of one’s memory.
The findings discussed above have important theoretical ramifications. These findings suggest
that people may focus on distinctly different cues to classify deliberate lies and honest mistakes.
When determining whether a statement is a deliberate lie, participants primarily described the
motive of the transgressor or focused on classical cues to deception such as the presence of nonverbal cues. Meanwhile, honest mistakes were classified as a result of either a memory error or
the lack of motive. These findings are the first of their kind to determine how people classify
deliberate lies and honest mistakes. In my future directions, I will describe ways to further
investigate the pattern of responding described above.
Limitations.
There are several limitations to this dissertation that limit some of the conclusions I can
make. First, this dissertation was completed the covid-19 pandemic. A subset of participants was
likely practicing proper social distancing while participating in the diary study. In this case, I
anticipate that participants communicate less with others and thus, this study may underestimate
the number of false statements reported on an everyday basis. Another limitation cause by the
covid-19 pandemic is that the interview study was completed remotely using Zoom. Participants
might have been less comfortable sharing details with my interviewers than they would in a faceto-face situation.
There are some limitations regarding the coding used in the study. First, not all the coder
pairs had high inter-rater reliability. In the future, I will use a single pair of coders for all
statements. Finally, this study did not manipulate the presence or absence of the categories
associated with the false statements. Because of this, I cannot tell the likelihood that participants
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are about to identify any perceived categories associated with false statements. In the section
below, I will discuss future directions for this line of research that aims to be better able to make
causal conclusions.
Future Directions and Conclusions.
The two studies discussed above provided evidence that a unique pattern of cues is used
to classify a statement as either a deliberate lie or an honest mistake. In the future, I would like to
conduct experimental research where participants make forced-choice honest mistake/deliberate
judgments while manipulating cues to honest mistake/deliberate judgments in novel scenarios. In
this study, I identified the importance of non-verbal cues, motive, and memorability on
classifying false statements. Deliberate lies were most associated with motive and non-verbal
cues. In contrast, honest mistakes were associated with a lack of motive and memorability. In a
future study, I can manipulate motive, non-verbal cues, and memorability and test whether
participants use the same criteria described by participants in this study. Additionally, this
approach will allow me to investigate causality and the strength of each predictor. Potentially,
variables such as memorability only influence the statement classification in the absence of
triggers such as motive and non-verbal cues. Afterwards, I want to extend my research to
investigate if a similar pattern of results occurs for sentencing perjury cases. In conclusion, this
study was the first of its kind to investigate the honest mistake vs. deliberate lie distinction. I
discovered that people use different cues to classify honest mistakes and deliberate lies.
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